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Abstract 
HOMEOSTASIS-DRIVEN RESPONSES TO CONSUMER SENSATIONS 
by 
Rhonda Hadi 
 
Advisor: Lauren Block, PhD 
This research examines the effect of experienced physical temperature on an individual’s 
decision-making process. Reliance on emotions can function as a warming process and reliance 
on cognitions can function as a cooling process, hence individuals are nonconsciously induced to 
alter their decision-making style according to their thermoregulatory objectives. My first two 
studies support a thermoregulatory account by demonstrating that the mere use of cognitive 
versus affective processing leads to both self-reported and objective changes in body 
temperature, and that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing 
temperature-related comfort. My last three studies demonstrate that individuals adopt these 
compensatory pathways on their own accord, and accordingly we document the effects of both 
physical and simulated temperature on choice, willingness to pay, and donation likelihood, and 
support the role of reliance on emotions as a mediator.  
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1 
Introduction 
 Consumers are constantly exposed to fluctuations in physical temperature. Some of these 
fluctuations happen gradually (e.g. changing seasons), while other changes happen much more 
suddenly (stepping inside an air-conditioned store, or taking a sip of a hot drink at a cafe).  In 
response to such variations, our bodies physiologically respond to ensure that we maintain a 
specific internal body temperature--a process known as thermoregulation (Alberts and Brunjes 
1978; Kirkes 1899). In this research, we suggest that autonomic physiological responses may not 
be the only way in which humans thermoregulate. We propose that humans can engage in 
thermoregulation via non-physiological means, a process we term “mental thermoregulation.” 
Specifically, we suggest that reliance on affect can function as a warming agent, reliance on 
cognitions can function as a cooling agent, and thus the adoption of a particular decision-making 
process can operate as a thermoregulatory mechanism. 
 How might mental processes serve as a direct vehicle for thermoregulation, an ostensibly 
physiological phenomenon? In the behavioral sciences, the term “cool” processing typically 
refers to those processes which involve calculative cognitions, linear if-then logical progression, 
and critical analysis, while “warm” processing alludes to associative systems involving feelings, 
desires, and emotions (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). This terminology suggests that at least 
semantically, each of these processes encompasses a distinct thermoregulatory tone. A number of 
research programs, including Barsalou’s (1999) framework on perceptual symbol systems, posit 
that semantic expressions are underpinned by sensory perception, hence semantic expressions 
that suggest sensory dimensions may in fact have physiological bases. If semantic expressions 
are usually underpinned by sensory bases, then it may be fruitful to investigate whether those 
sensory pathways exist, and why. In this research, we suggest that reliance on emotions can 
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function as a warming process whereas reliance on cognitions functions as a cooling process, and 
therefore individuals may alter their decision-making style to move toward their 
thermoregulatory objectives.  
 Specifically, we propose that experienced temperatures beyond an organism’s 
homeostatic levels may lead them to compensate by adopting a decision making style with an 
opposite thermoregulatory tone. In other words, when exposed to cooler than homeostatic 
temperature conditions, we expect individuals to respond with a “warm” decision-making 
process (taking an affective pathway) in an effort to warm up, whereas in warmer than 
homeostatic conditions, we expect individuals to apply a “cool” decision making process (taking 
a cognitive pathway) in an effort to cool down. 
This research makes several meaningful theoretical contributions. We suggest that an 
individual may choose to embody a decision-making process that is semantically consistent with 
his or her thermoregulatory objectives (and thus inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory 
state). As far as the authors are aware, no research has examined whether an individual’s 
decision-making process can function to change perceived or actual temperature, nor whether an 
attempt to do so may be part of an individual’s nonconsciously activated regulatory strategy. 
 Thus, unlike much of the literature based on embodied cognition, this research provides 
an example and explanation of why individuals may respond to physical sensations in an 
oppositional, compensatory fashion (not in a manner congruent with the experienced sensation). 
Instead of merely reacting to the physical temperature in a metaphorically assimilative manner 
(i.e. relying on emotions more when warm), physical sensations might instead activate a 
thermoregulatory goal, thus motivating individuals to employ a process with a contrasting 
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thermoregulatory tone. To support these predictions, we will briefly review the relevant 
literatures. 
 
4 
Conceptual Framework 
Human Responses to Temperature  
 Responses to temperatures within the comfort zone. Previous research has documented 
that consumers’ physical surroundings significantly impact their judgments and decisions (Belk 
1975). However, temperature has remained a relatively understudied atmospheric variable, 
despite the fact that it is ever-present, and consumers seem to be quite conscious of it (Cheema 
and Patrick 2012).  Recently, researchers have documented some important consequences of 
modest ambient temperatures on consumer behavior. One noteworthy example is work by 
Cheema and Patrick (2012), which examines the effect of a subtle range of temperatures (67 - 
77°F) on task performance. Building on a thermal stress paradigm, they find that relatively warm 
temperatures (around 77°F) increase thermal load, leading to increased reliance on System 1 
(heuristic) processing, and thus hampering performance on complex tasks. Along the same vein, 
Tong and colleagues (2013) find that within a comfortable range of temperatures (61 – 79°F), 
cool temperatures encourage primarily systematic processing and thus enhance performance on 
simple tasks, while warm temperatures prompt primarily heuristic processing, and thus lead to 
better performance on complex tasks. 
 Importantly, the work above examined temperatures within a modest range (61 – 79°F). 
According to Hancock and Warm’s Maximal Adaptability Model (MAM; 1989), all these 
temperatures fall within the so-called “comfort zone” (i.e. 60.8–84.2°F), but only the cold 
temperature conditions fell within the more narrowly-defined “normative zone” (i.e. 62.6–
73.4°F). According to MAM, temperatures within the comfort zone but outside the normative 
zone will leave people with limited cognitive resources to focus on tasks. Thus in the work by 
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Cheema and Patrick (2012) and Tong and colleagues (2013), participants only experienced 
thermal-stress in the warm conditions, but all participants were “comfortable” temperature-wise. 
 But what happens when temperatures move outside the limited “comfort zone” range? In 
the present research, we examine consumer responses to temperature that are outside this 
“comfort” zone. In other words, we explore how consumers behave in temperatures that may feel 
“too cold” (hypostress) or “too warm” (hyperstress, Hancock and Warm 1989). This distinction 
is crucial, because we would expect such temperatures to elicit goal-directed responses, while we 
would not expect such motivated behavior if consumers feel thermally comfortable. To explore 
how such excessively high or low temperatures impact consumers’ behavior, we next turn to 
literature on thermoregulation. 
 Physical Thermoregulation. Individuals often face fluctuations in their external 
environment (e.g. changing weather). In response to such variations, our bodies have a tendency 
to physiologically regulate our internal environment to ensure stability---a dynamic, iterative 
process known as homeostasis (Jänig 2008; Marieb and Hoehn 2007). One homeostatic process 
that is vital to our survival is thermoregulation: our body must maintain a specific internal body 
temperature, thus we regulate our internal environment to achieve and maintain a stable and 
balanced condition via autonomic responses (Alberts and Brunjes 1978; Kirkes 1899). 
Accordingly, many physiological responses to heat and cold (e.g. sweating, shivering) are tied to 
our need to keep our core body temperature stable (Bell and Greene 1982). Many organs 
function to promote thermoregulation, including our brains. One method our brains use to help 
encourage behavioral thermoregulation is via state-dependent alterations of hedonic perception: 
our brains generate pleasure or aversion towards stimuli depending on our internal state and 
corresponding homeostatic needs (Cabanac 1971; Rolls 2005). Specifically, the brain generates 
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pleasure toward warm stimuli when our core temperature is colder than basal requirements, and 
pleasure toward cool stimuli when we are warmer than homeostatic temperature requirements 
(Panksepp 1998). This suggests that experienced temperatures can create different 
thermoregulatory objectives, and one route to fulfill those objectives is via attraction to 
physically warm or cold stimuli (King and Janiszewski 2011).  
 Compensatory Behaviors in Response to Temperature. However, purely physiological 
thermoregulation may not be the only way in which humans respond to overly hot or cold 
temperatures. A growing body of literature seems to suggest that people may compensate for 
suboptimal temperature conditions via alternative behavioral responses. For example, Parker and 
Tavassoli (2000) accumulated correlational data suggesting that the per capita consumption of 
stimulating products like alcohol, cocoa, coffee, tea and tobacco is higher in high latitudes, even 
when controlling for income. In a follow-up paper, it is argued that people in colder climates are 
below their optimal stimulation level, and thus may be more likely to seek sensation and arousal 
(Tavassoli 2009). This is supported by research that suggests that cold (vs. warm) weather leads 
to increases in aggressiveness and risk-taking, resulting in higher stock market returns (Cao and 
Wei 2005). Further, other research streams seem to suggest that people may try to counteract for 
excess cold through other compensatory behaviors. For example, findings suggest that 
individuals are more motivated to watch romantic movies and engage in interpersonal activities 
when they feel physically cold, to reduce the feeling of coldness (Hong and Sun 2011; Zhang 
and Risen 2010). More recent research has also suggested that consumers associate abundance 
with physical warmth, and thus physical cold drives increased purchase intention and purchase 
quantities (Wang and Zhou 2012). Thus the existing literature has suggested that consuming 
stimulating products, partaking in interpersonal activities, and increasing purchase quantity all 
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seem to function as “warming” agents.  
 Collectively then, extant research indicates that individuals often respond to physical 
temperatures in a manner that seems to be compensatory in nature. We suggest that this is indeed 
the case, and further propose that humans may compensate for high or low physical temperatures 
via largely mental means, a process we term “mental thermoregulation.” Specifically, we 
propose that the use of a particular decision-making style (using either an affective or cognitive 
pathway) can serve as a thermoregulatory mechanism by making individuals feel either hot or 
cold, respectively. But why might one’s reliance on emotions vs. cognitions affect how thy feel 
thermally? To explore this question, we turn to support from literature on perceived temperature. 
 
Antecedents of Perceived Temperature 
 Ample research has demonstrated that experienced thoughts and feelings are not 
independent of physical and somatic perception (Barsalou 2008; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991), and accordingly, cognitions and feelings can illicit perceptual stimulation and somatic 
responses (Barsalou 1999; Schubert 2005). Accordingly, the notion that psychological behaviors 
can lead to physiological temperatures responses is not startling. In fact, research in social 
perception suggests that affective feelings can have distinct thermoregulatory tones (Ax 1953). 
Recent research in neuroscience has suggested that the same part of the brain (the insular cortex) 
is involved in processing both psychological and physical warmth information (Kang et al. 
2010).  
 Several researchers have documented the ability of non-physiological factors to impact 
an individual’s perceived thermal state. Color cues (Szocs and Biswas 2013), anger-related 
thoughts (Wilkowski et al. 2009), communion traits (Szymkow et al. 2013), and feelings of 
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loneliness (Zhong and Leonardelli 2008) have all been shown to impact temperature perceptions. 
In the last body of work, for example, participants felt colder and evaluated warm food more 
highly when a social exclusion experience was either primed (asking participants to recall a past 
experience) or induced (via a virtual interaction) (Zhong and Leonardelli 2008). Together, these 
studies demonstrate that psychological concepts can in fact impact how warm or cold an 
individual feels. 
 However, such research represents particular concepts deliberately primed or induced by 
the experimenter. But might an individual, on his or her own accord, choose to adopt a particular 
decision-making process? 
 
Present Research: Mental Thermoregulation 
 In this research, we suggest that an individual may choose to adopt a decision-making 
process that is metaphorically consistent with his or her thermoregulatory objective (and thus 
inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory state). As far as the authors are aware, no research 
has examined whether an individual’s decision-making process can function to change perceived 
or actual temperature, nor whether an attempt to do so may be part of an individual’s regulatory 
strategy. 
 Importantly, we argue that these effects will manifest when experienced temperatures 
shift above or below homeostatic levels. Such temperature changes activate thermoregulatory 
objectives, which are what ultimately lead to differences in decision-making style. This 
distinguishes the current research from previous work that examines the important effects of 
temperature at modest, comfortable ranges (Cheema and Patrick 2012, Tong et al. 2013).  
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 My motivational regulatory account, which focuses on the processing pathways activated 
by experienced temperatures, is distinct from the extant research on metaphor-consistent 
behavior in response to physical sensations (Ackerman, Nocera, and Bargh 2010; Williams and 
Bargh 2008). In the latter research, metaphor-consistent behavior arises because of established 
associative links between two concepts in memory (Ackerman, Nocera, and Bargh 2010; 
Williams and Bargh 2008). For example, warm cups make us think the person who gave it to us 
has a “warmer” personality (Williams and Bargh 2008). This “haptic mindset” triggers a transfer 
of the activated metaphor (e.g., warm) from the original touched object to the target object 
(Ackerman, Nocera and Bargh 2010). Importantly, the transfer is limited to the specific concept 
and not generalized beyond that; for example, touching hard (vs. soft) objects led participants to 
rate a target person as more rigid and strict, but not more or less positive overall (Ackerman, 
Nocera and Bargh 2010). Such literature seems to demonstrate metaphor-consistent behavior in 
response to physical sensations, while the current research documents an opposite pattern of 
causal direction. This shift in directionality stems from two important distinctions. First, as noted 
above, my mental thermoregulation framework represents a goal-driven explanation for 
behavioral responses to physical sensations. If physical sensations are within comfortable, 
homeostatic levels, there is no reason to expect a motivated response. The second distinction 
involves the dependent variables being examined. For example, previous research has shown that 
experienced temperatures can lead to metaphorically-consistent incidental judgments (e.g. warm 
cups make us think the person who gave it to us has a “warmer” personality; Williams and Bargh 
2008). However, my account suggests that temperature can also change the way we make 
decisions, given that the adopted process allows us to thermally compensate. While there is no 
reason to believe the specific content of our judgments will impact our resulting temperature 
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(e.g. judging a person to have a warmer personality should not necessarily make us feel warmer, 
and we can come up with such judgments via cognitive or affective means), we suggest and 
demonstrate that the decision-making style an individual adopts (i.e. cognitive vs. affective 
pathway) will indeed have an impact. Thus, by exploring responses to physical sensations via a 
regulatory framework, this work addresses the call to more critically examine processes by 
which physical sensations exert their effects (Krishna 2012; Zhang and Li 2012). 
 Thus, we contribute to literature on thermoregulation, atmospherics, and the role of affect 
in decision-making by suggesting that reliance on emotions (cognitions) can function as a 
warming (cooling) process, and individuals may accordingly alter their decision-making style to 
fulfill thermoregulatory objectives in response to experienced physical temperatures that are 
cooler or warmer than homeostatic levels in their internal milieu. Assuming that individuals start 
off at a relatively homeostatic base level temperature, exposure to excess physical warmth 
(coolness) will activate a desire to cool down (warm up), and thus the individual will attempt to 
fulfill this objective by adopting a cognitive (affective) decision making style. My proposed 
framework, along with a pictorial representation of the mental thermoregulation process, is 
depicted in Appendix A. 
 Mental thermoregulation represents a unique framework for the study of behavioral 
response to physical sensation- therefore, I conducted a series of studies that collectively provide 
compelling empirical support for my theorizing, but individually provide support for each 
element of my theorizing replicated across different domains and dependent variables. My first 
two studies support the mental thermoregulation explanation by providing evidence that the mere 
use of cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an individual’s perceived and actual 
temperature (Study 1), and the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing 
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temperature-related comfort (Study 2). In my last three studies, I test the hypothesis that cold 
(warm) temperature leads individuals to spontaneously rely more on affect (cognitions) when 
making decisions. Specifically, I examine the effect of temperature willingness to pay (Study 3), 
donation likelihood (Study 4), and choice (Study 5), and support the role of reliance on emotions 
as a mediator. Thus taken as a set, these five studies provide converging support for my mental 
thermoregulation framework (Appendix A). 
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Study 1: Temperature Responses 
 My proposed mental thermoregulation framework hinges on the key prerequisite that 
affective and cognitive pathways can function as warming and cooling mechanisms respectively. 
However, as far as the author is aware, this has never been empirically tested in the existing 
literature. Thus, the purpose of Study 1 was to support the validity of my thermoregulation 
account by demonstrating objective, physical temperature fluctuations as a result of affective vs. 
cognitive decision-making. 
 The study was a 2 level (task instructions: affective vs. cognitive) between subjects 
design. Upon entering the lab, subjects were equipped with wireless iButtons to measure their 
temperature over the duration of the experiment. After a filler task, participants were given 
explicit instructions to describe either their feelings (affective condition) or evaluative thoughts 
(cognitive condition) in assessing a series of scenarios and I examined the changes in their 
physical temperature as a result. I expected that affective processing (as compared to cognitive 
processing) would result in objectively warmer (vs. cooler) physical temperature, suggesting that 
the ability of affective/cognitive pathways to produce physiological temperature responses. 
 
Method 
 Upon entering the lab, fifty-eight undergraduate students were asked to indicate which 
hand was their non-dominant hand. The experimenter then proceeded to affix an iButton, a 
wireless temperature monitor, to the index finger of the participant’s non-dominant hand using 
medical tape. I chose to capture temperature at the fingertip because previous research suggests 
skin-temperature readings at the fingertip are a convenient and accurate measure for the 
assessment of psychophysiological responses and thermoregulatory vasoconstriction (Kistler, 
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Mariauzouls, and von Berlepsch 1998; Rubeinstein and Sessler 1990). iButtons contain a 
semiconductor temperature sensor and a computer chip with a real time clock and memory 
enclosed in a 16 × 6 mm2 stainless steel can. Thus, the iButton functions as both a thermometer 
(constantly measuring participants’ temperature) and a data logger (recording the observed 
temperature at specified intervals, as frequently as every 8 seconds). This provided the 
experimenters with continuous time-stamped temperature data for each participant. 
Manufacturing specifications indicate precision of +/-0.125  °C (+/-0.225  °F), and previous 
studies have validated the use of iButtons on human skin for clinical and field measurements 
(Hasselberg, McMahon, and Parker 2013; Marken Lichtenbelt et al. 2006).  
 After being outfitted with an iButton, participants started off with a neutral filler task that 
lasted approximately ten minutes. The purpose of the filler task was two-fold: first, it served as a 
calibration period to allow the iButton time to acclimate to the individual’s skin temperature, and 
second, it allowed me to obtain temperature estimates for participants in a neutral state (neither 
explicitly cognitive nor affective). After participants completed the filler task, the experimenter 
took note of the exact time (in order to match it up with the real-time temperature data later) 
before getting the participants started on the second task. 
 The second task involved the manipulation. Participants were given explicit instructions to 
describe either their feelings or evaluative thoughts in assessing a series of scenarios (“Going to 
a rock concert” “Taking a test at school,” “Spending Thanksgiving with your family,” and 
“Watching your favorite TV show at home.”). In one condition (which I refer to as “affective 
instructions”), respondents were instructed to focus and describe their feelings and emotions in 
relation to each scenario. In the other condition (which I refer to as “cognitive instructions”), 
respondents were told to focus on their objective assessments in describing each scenario (see 
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Appendix B, the instructions were adapted from Pham et al. 2001). 
 After each participant completed this task, the experimenter again noted the exact time. 
Participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their assessments in an attempt to ascertain 
whether the manipulation did indeed succeed to elicit participants’ use of affective vs. cognitive 
pathways. This was measured via a four-item scale scale adapted from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999 
(all seven-point items; “My decision of how much to pay for insurance was driven by:  "my 
thoughts (1)/my feelings (7)," "my prudent self (1)/my impulsive self (7)," "my rational side 
(1)/my emotional side (7)," and "my head (1)/my heart (7)," α = .76). Lastly, participants 
indicated their gender and ethnicity. After participants completed the survey, the experimenter 
detached the iButton from the participant, and downloaded the logged temperature data. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Four students entered the laboratory with food or drink (i.e. coffee and frozen yogurt) that 
they consumed throughout the duration the experiment. Because such consumption can clearly 
impact body temperature, these individuals were excluded from the remaining analysis. In 
addition, three students were interrupted during the duration of the experiment (i.e. for a 
bathroom break and to answer a phone call). Because of the time-stamped nature of the 
temperature data, these individuals were also excluded, resulting in 51 active observations for 
analysis. 
Manipulation check. As predicted, results did indeed demonstrate a significant main 
effect of processing instructions on respondents’ reliance on affect, (MCognitive = 2.80 vs. MAffective 
= 4.34, F(1, 49) = 27.89, p < .01). However, a stem-and-leaf plot indicated that in the cognitive 
condition, there were two participants who scored high enough in reliance on affect to be 
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considered “extreme” cases. This demonstrates that these participants are outliers, and also 
suggests that the two subjects failed to follow the processing instructions (i.e., they used affect 
instead of cognition in their processing). Thus, these two participants were removed from further 
analysis. 
Time Spent on Task. Because task time was not fixed, some participants took longer to 
complete the designated task than others. I expected that individuals with the affective 
instructions would spend a shorter amount of time on the task than individuals with the cognitive 
instructions, since previous literature has repeatedly documented that judgments based on 
affective assessments are reached faster than those based on reason-based assessments (Pham 
2007; Pham et al. 2001; Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen 1998; Zajonc 1980). Results from an 
analysis of variance confirmed this expected difference, with a significant main effect of 
processing instructions on respondents’ time spent on the task (MCognitive = 18.90 minutes vs. 
MAffective = 15.34 minutes, F(1, 49) = 4.04, p < .05).  
Hierarchical Linear Model. By matching the time-stamped temperature data with the 
recorded task times, the experimenter was able to attain a base temperature estimate for each 
participant upon starting the designated affective/cognitive task, along with the participants’ 
temperature every 8 seconds while performing the given task (see figure 1 for visual 
representations of data from two sample participants). As previously mentioned, some 
participants took longer to complete the designated task than others, which resulted in a different 
number of data points for each participant. I thus applied a longitudinal hierarchical linear model 
(HLM) to analyze the data (Khare and Inman 2006; Lam et al. 2013; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Snijders 1996). The purpose of this analysis was to assess the impact of the manipulation 
(task instructions) on how participants’ temperature changed over time. An important advantage 
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of using HLM is that it allows for differences across subjects in the number of measurement 
occasions, without needing to discard any data (Snijders 1996). In this model, the Level 1 
regression captures within-individual changes in temperature as a function of time. I clocked 
time such that the first temperature estimate upon starting the designated task represented the 
start of the task (Time 0). Level 2 equations in the model express the Level 1 intercept and slopes 
as a function of the between-group predictor (task instructions). Thus, the Level 2 equations 
allow us to assess the impact of affective vs. cognitive instructions on an individual’s physical 
temperature changes over time. The model specification was as follows: 
 
Level 1: 
 TEMPti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + eti 
Level 2: 
 π0i = β00 + β01*(TASKi) + r0i 
 π1i = β10 + β11*(TASKi) + r1i 
 
where TEMP= recorded temperature, TIME=time elapsed, and TASK=task instructions 
(cognitive or affective). Analysis results indicate that both the overall intercept and the task-
specific intercept were significant (β00 = 87.21, t = 90.42, p < .001; and, β01 = 2.46, t = 1.71, p = 
.09 respectively). The overall slope was not significant (β10 = -0.01, t = -1.64, p > .1), suggesting 
that on average, time has no significant effect on temperature. However, and most importantly to 
my hypotheses, the coefficient for task-specific slope was indeed significant (β11 = 0.02, t = 2.65, 
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p < .02). This suggests that task instructions did indeed impact the effect of time on temperature. 
Importantly, the coefficient is positive, which suggests that affective instructions led to increases 
in temperatures compared to cognitive instructions. 
Figure 1 
Visual Representation of Data from Two Sample Subjects- Study 1 
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 Simple Slopes Analysis. The HLM results suggest that the task instructions led to 
differences in individuals’ temperature over time. However, I also wanted analyze the data 
within-conditions, to more closely examine directionality of how cognitive and affective 
instructions each impacted individuals’ temperature. To do so, I ran a simple slopes analysis, 
using a calculator allowing for differences in the number of measurement occasions across 
subjects (Bauer and Curran 2005; Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006). Results indicated that for 
affective subjects, the slope was positive and significant (β = 0.0093, t = 2.08, p = .04), while for 
cognitive subjects, the slope was negative and marginally significant (β = -0.0038, t = -1.71, p = 
.09). These results suggest that overall, those individuals who completed the affective 
instructions showed increases in temperature on average, while those individuals who completed 
the cognitive instructions showed decreases in temperature on average. 
 Analysis of Variance. Lastly, I conducted a mixed analysis of variance procedure to 
assess the impact of the two different processing instructions (cognitive vs. affective) on 
participants’ physical temperature across two points in time (before and after the cognitive or 
affective task). This additional analysis adds value above the previous analysis because it allows 
me to examine the difference in individuals’ temperature across conditions at the end of the task 
(because individuals had unique task times, this contrast could not be calculated in the previous 
analysis). Results demonstrated a significant interaction between instruction type and time (F(1, 
47) = 8.09,  p < .01). Before starting the cognitive/affective task, there was no significant 
difference between the physical temperature of participants in the two conditions (MCognitive = 
86.87 vs. MAffective = 87.93, F(1, 47) < .1). However, after the designated task, results did indeed 
demonstrate a significant difference between instruction conditions: as predicted, participants 
who completed the task via affective instructions produced a higher temperature than individuals 
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who completed the task via cognitive instructions (MCognitive = 85.83 vs. MAffective = 89.29, F(1, 
47) = 5.24, p < .05; see figure 2 for a visual representation of contrasts). 
 
Figure 2 
Mean Temperture by Condition- Study 1 
 
 
A second set of planned contrasts examined how individuals’ temperatures changed 
within each condition. Results from these contrasts support the pattern of results found in the 
simple slopes analysis. In the cognitive instructions condition, individuals’ temperature were 
marginally significantly lower after the task, as compared to before the task (MBefore = 86.87 vs. 
MAfter = 85.83, F(1, 47) = 3.36, p < .08). Participants in the affective conditions displayed an 
opposite pattern: their temperature were significantly higher after the task, as compared to before 
the task (MBefore = 87.93 vs. MAfter = 89.29, F(1, 47) = 4.74, p < .05).  
Taken together, results from this study support the thermoregulation explanation by 
suggesting that the mere use of cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an 
individual’s physical temperature via a physiological warming (vs. cooling) process. 
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Study 2: Forced Pathways 
 The purpose of the second study was two-fold: first, to add additional support for the 
thermoregulation explanation by suggesting that the mere use of cognitive versus affective 
pathways can alter how warm or cold an individual feels (not just objective measures), and more 
importantly, to demonstrate that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can aid in providing 
temperature-related comfort. In other words, I examined whether individuals feeling too hot or 
too cold could at least partially thermoregulate by adopting a compensatory decision-making 
process. Further, previous research has suggested that temperature changes may impact arousal 
levels (Poulton 1976), although the literature documents that uncomfortable temperatures in 
either direction (hot or cold) are both arousing and sedative (Anderson 1989). Nevertheless, I 
added a measure to assess and control for any differences in perceived arousal as a result of the 
temperature manipulations. 
 The study took the form of a 2 (temperature: cold vs. warm) x 2 (task instructions: 
affective vs. cognitive) between subjects design. After the temperature manipulation, participants 
were given explicit instructions to describe either their feelings (affective condition) or 
evaluative thoughts (cognitive condition) in assessing a series of scenarios (as in Study 1), and I 
examined the degree to which individuals felt a difference in physical temperature as a result. I 
expected that emotional processing (as compared to cognitive processing) would result in 
warmer (vs. cooler) perceived temperature. Thus, when comparing all four conditions resulting 
from the 2 x 2 design, I expected that those in the cold-cognitive condition would be the coldest, 
those in the warm-affective would be the warmest, and those in the cold-affective and warm-
cognitive conditions would be somewhere in between (but I made no predictions of which of 
these two conditions would be warmer, since I make no predictions about the comparative 
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warming/cooling power of the temperature vs. instructions manipulations). Importantly, to 
support my thermoregulatory process explanation, I expected that in the cold temperature 
conditions, those in the affective condition would be more comfortable in terms of temperature 
that those in the cognitive condition, but that in the warm temperature condition, the reverse 
would be true.  
 
Method 
 One hundred and seventeen undergraduate students were assigned to one of two 
temperature conditions. Temperature was manipulated by asking participants to hold onto a cup 
throughout the duration of the experiment. As a cover story, respondents were told that the 
experimenters were interested in their ability to multi-task. Depending on condition, the cup was 
filled with either cold water or warm water before participants entered the lab (manipulation used 
in Williams and Bargh 2008). Cold water was obtained from an ice-filled cooler, while the warm 
water was poured from an electric kettle (cup surface temperature ranged from approximately 
45–60°F in the cold condition, and 110–125°F in the warm condition). After the temperature 
manipulation, I measured mood and arousal. Mood was measured using five 7-point Likert scale 
items (Good Mood, Content, Cheerful, Unhappy (reverse coded), Bored (reverse coded); α = 
.80), and perceived arousal was measured using a 24-item scale (ex. “alert,” “excited,” “drowsy,” 
taken from Anderson, Deuser and DeNeve 1995, α = .92). 
 Next, participants were given explicit task instructions to describe either their feelings or 
evaluative thoughts in assessing a series of scenarios (as in Study 1). In this experiment, I was 
interested in whether the affective versus cognitive pathway instructions would lead to 
differences in perceived physical temperature. Thus, afterwards, I asked participants to indicate 
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their perceived temperature (“Please indicate how warm or cold you currently feel in terms of 
temperature” on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by “extremely cold” and “extremely warm.” 
However, to support my thermoregulation process, I was most interested in how well each 
process allowed individuals to “mentally thermoregulate.” Thus, participants were asked to 
indicate their comfort temperature-wise (“Please indicate how comfortable you currently feel, in 
terms of temperature”) on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by “very uncomfortable” and “very 
comfortable.” Afterwards, participants indicated gender and age. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Covariates and Control Measures. Neither gender nor age significantly interacted with 
the independent variable (affective vs. cognitive instructions) nor covaried significantly with the 
dependent measures in the study (perceived temperature and thermal comfort), and were thus 
excluded from the remaining analysis. In addition, the temperature manipulation did not have a 
significant impact on perceived arousal (F(1, 115) = 1.13, p > .1) or mood (F(1, 115) < 1), and 
were thus excluded from the remaining analysis as well.   
 Perceived Temperature. According to my proposed framework, I expected that emotional 
processing (as compared to cognitive processing) would result in warmer (vs. cooler) perceived 
temperatures regardless of whether participants were exposed to the warm or cold temperature 
manipulation (a main effect). As predicted, the results did indeed demonstrate a significant main 
effect of processing instructions on respondents’ perceived temperature (MAffective = 5.98 vs. 
MCognitive = 5.13, F(1, 113) = 9.34, p < .01). Thus, respondents’ self-reported temperature in the 
affective conditions was significantly higher than in the cognitive condition. Temperature and 
instruction manipulations did not have an interactive effect on perceived temperature (p > .6), 
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nor did I expect them to. However, as I predicted, a planned linear contrast confirmed that 
perceived temperatures from the four conditions resulting from our temperature x instructions 
design followed a linear pattern (the order hypothesized was, in order of cold to warm: matched: 
cold-cognitive; mixed: warm-cognitive/cold-affective; and matched: warm-affective (F(1, 113) = 
4.49, p < .05). Additional analyses of planned contrasts indicated that the perceived temperature 
for those participants in the cold-affective condition was significantly warmer than for those in 
the cold-cognitive condition (MCold-Affective = 5.93 vs. MCold-Cognitive = 4.97, F(1, 113) = 6.30, p < 
.05), and those in the warm-affective condition displayed marginally significantly warmer 
perceived temperature than those in the warm-cognitive condition (MWarm-Affective = 6.04 vs. 
MWarm-Cognitive = 5.33, F(1, 113) = 3.00, p < .09), see figure 3 for a visual representation of the 
contrasts). These results demonstrate a perceived warming (vs. cooling) impact of employing an 
affective (vs. cognitive) pathway, regardless of the initial physical temperature manipulation. 
Hence, this study supports the thermoregulation explanation by suggesting that the mere use of 
cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an individual’s perception of physical 
temperature. 
Figure 3 
Mean Perceived Temperature by Condition- Study 2 
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 Thermal Comfort. Because my theorizing suggests that both cognitive and affective 
pathways can function as regulatory mechanisms, I expected an interactive effect on thermal 
comfort, depending on the initially experienced temperature. Indeed, an ANOVA revealed a 
significant temperature x instructions interaction on respondent’s thermal comfort (F(1, 113) = 
7.47; p < .01). In the cold condition, affective respondents were more comfortable in terms of 
temperature than cognitive respondents (MAffective = 6.55 vs. MCognitive = 5.61, F(1, 113) = 4.43, p 
< .05), but the reverse was true in the warm condition (MAffective = 5.79 vs. MCognitive = 6.63, F(1, 
113) = 3.14, p < .08, see figure 4 for a visual representation of the interaction and contrasts). In 
other words, participants whose instructions had a thermoregulatory tone that contrasted with 
their initial experienced physical temperature (cold-affective and warm-cognitive respondents) 
were the most comfortable, suggesting that they were better able to thermoregulate compared to 
individuals whose instructions matched their initial physical temperature manipulation (cold-
cognitive and warm-affective respondents).   
 
Figure 4 
Mean thermal comfort by Condition- Study 2 
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Study 3: Clocks 
 While my first two studies support the thermoregulatory power of affective and cognitive 
decision-making, the purpose of study 3 was to examine whether individuals spontaneously 
apply this regulatory strategy when exposed to temperatures above or below homeostatic levels. 
In other words, this study sought to examine the impact of physical temperature exposure on 
individuals’ reliance on affect in decision-making, and thus support the front-end of my proposed 
mental thermoregulation framework (Appendix A). Specifically, I examined the degree to which 
individuals were relying on affect by measuring the maximum amount they would be willing to 
pay for insurance for an object (an antique clock; adapted from Hsee and Kunreuther 2000). 
Depending on condition, the clock had either a high sentiment description (indicating high 
affective value) or a low sentiment description (indicating low affective value). If one is not 
relying on affect (which I propose should be the case in the warm temperature condition), then 
there should be no difference between the maximum amount an individual is willing to pay 
under the two object description conditions. However, if an individual is in fact relying on his or 
her emotions (which I propose should be the case in the cold temperature condition), then we 
would expect participants to be willing to pay more to insure the object with a high sentiment 
description than for the object with a low sentiment description. 
 
Method 
 One hundred and twelve undergraduate students were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions according to the 2 (temperature: cold vs. warm) x 2 (object description: low sentiment 
vs. high sentiment) design. Temperature was manipulated using the same cup-holding procedure 
as in Study 2. After the temperature manipulation, all participants were presented with a 
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hypothetical scenario in which they would have the opportunity to purchase insurance for an 
antique clock (Hsee and Kunreuther 2000). Participants read a description of the clock which 
differed depending on condition: the clock was described in either a low sentiment or high 
sentiment fashion (see Appendix B). In the low sentiment condition the object description 
implied no sentimental value to the subject, while in the high sentiment condition the object 
description did imply sentimental value to the subject. 
 After reading the scenario and object description, respondents indicated the maximum 
amount they would be willing to pay for insurance of the clock, which was the main dependent 
variable of interest. After making the decision, participants were asked to indicate the basis of 
their decision (again using the scale adapted from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Lastly, 
participants indicated their gender and ethnicity. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Covariates and Control Measures. Neither gender nor ethnicity significantly interacted 
with the independent variable (temperature) nor covaried significantly with the dependent 
measures in the study, and were thus excluded from the remaining analysis.  
 Willingness to Pay. As predicted, an ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between 
temperature and object description on willingness to pay (F(1, 108) = 4.46, p < .05).  This 
indicates that the difference between the two object description conditions was significantly 
different in the two temperature conditions. As expected, in the cold temperature condition, the 
difference between the low sentiment and high sentiment conditions was significant (MLow Sent. = 
$8.71, MHigh Sent. = $52.12; F(1, 108) = 17.04 p <.01), and in the hypothesized direction 
(participants were willing to pay significantly more for the clock when it had a highly 
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sentimental description). In the warm temperature condition however, as expected, the difference 
between the two object description conditions was not significantly different (MLow Sent. = $19.71, 
MHigh Sent. = $32.22; F(1, 108)= 1.52, p >.1). Furthermore, the contrast between the cold and 
warm conditions was not significant in the low sentiment condition (MCold = $8.71, MWarm = 
$19.71; F(1, 108) = 1.19 p > 1), but was marginally significant in the high sentiment condition 
(MCold = $52.12, MWarm = $32.22; F(1, 108) = 3.52 p < .07). See figure 5 for a visual 
representation of the interaction and planned contrasts.  
 
Figure 5 
Mean Willingness to Pay by Condition- Study 3 
 
 
 
 Decision Basis. Again, the four-item decision basis scale measured whether decisions 
across different conditions were based on respondents' affective reactions or cognitions. To 
determine the extent to which reliance on emotions mediated the effect of temperature on 
willingness to pay, I applied a moderated mediation bootstrap procedure (Model 8 in the macro 
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suggested by Hayes, 2012). I expected that the indirect effect of temperature on willingness to 
pay through decision basis would be significant in the high sentiment condition (where there is 
an opportunity for an affective response), but not significant in the low sentiment condition 
(where there is little opportunity for an affective response). Upon specifying a confidence 
interval of 95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the analysis confirmed a conditional indirect 
effect: in the low sentiment description condition, the indirect effect of temperature on 
willingness to pay through decision basis was not significant, with a confidence interval 
including zero (-9.4192 to 4.9247), but in the high sentiment description condition, the indirect 
effect of temperature on willingness to pay through decision basis was significant, with a 
confidence interval excluding zero (-19.0283 to -1.3141). These results suggest that when there 
is an opportunity for an affective response (ex. via a sentimental description), reliance on 
emotions mediates the effect of temperature on willingness to pay. 
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Study 4: Pandas 
 The purpose of this study was to expand the boundaries of the thermoregulation process 
examined in Study 3. Particularly, I wished to demonstrate that the extent to which an individual 
relies on his or her emotions in decision-making is influenced not only by actual physical 
temperature, but can also be impacted by changes in perceived temperature.  Specifically, I 
investigated whether mere simulated temperature influences reliance on emotions in decision-
making. Thus, I manipulated temperature (cold vs. warm) via mental simulation. I adapted a 
procedure from Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004). Hsee and Rottenstreich argue that when 
individuals rely on affect in making decisions, they become insensitive to scale differences (i.e., 
differences in magnitude). Thus, individuals relying on their emotions are willing to donate as 
much money to save one panda as to save four pandas, but those using cognitive processing are 
willing to donate more to save more pandas. The study took the form of a 2 (temperature 
simulation: cold vs. warm) x 2 (scope: one vs. four) between subjects design, and examined the 
degree to which individuals were relying on affect by measuring their likelihood of donating 
toward an effort to save the endangered panda/pandas. For those individuals in the cold 
temperature simulation (who we predicted would rely on affect), I expected to find no difference 
between donation likelihood in the one panda vs. four panda conditions. However, in the warm 
temperature simulation condition, one would expect participants to be more willing to donate in 
efforts to save the four pandas than in efforts to save just one. 
 
Method 
 For this study, responses were collected from ninety-eight participants via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk system. Respondents were presented with temperature simulation instructions 
 
30 
depending on condition. Simulated temperature was manipulated by asking participants to read, 
imagine, and retype a scenario in which they were consuming either a cold or warm beverage. 
Participants in the cold condition read the following: 
“Imagine that you are sitting at a cafe, and you are given a glass of iced tea. Visualize 
yourself accepting the glass. As you hold the glass, you can feel the coolness of the glass 
against the palms of your hands. You continue holding the glass, until you have finished 
your iced tea.” 
Participants in the warm condition read the following: 
“Imagine that you are sitting at a cafe, and you are given a mug of warm tea. Visualize 
yourself accepting the mug. As you hold the mug, you can feel the warmth of the mug 
against the palms of your hands. You continue holding the mug, until you have finished 
your warm tea.” 
 As a manipulation check after the temperature simulation, respondents were asked to 
indicate how warm or cold they felt on a 7-point scale anchored by “extremely cold” and 
“extremely warm.”  
 Afterwards, respondents read a hypothetical scenario that described rescue efforts to save 
either one or four endangered pandas. In the one-panda condition, participants read a scenario 
about a rescue effort for one panda, and only one panda was pictured. In the four-panda 
condition, participants read a scenario about a rescue effort for four pandas, and four pictures of 
the panda were presented (see Appendix D). The main dependent variable of interest was 
donation likelihood (“How likely would you be to donate money towards the rescue effort?”), 
measured on a 7-point scale anchored by “very unlikely” and “very likely.” After indicating their 
donation likelihood, participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their decision, again in 
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an attempt to ascertain whether decisions across different conditions were based on respondents' 
affective reactions or cognitions. These decision basis items were the same that were used in 
study 1 (α = .90). In addition, participants completed a Likert-scaled item measuring their 
general concern for endangered animals to be used as potential covariate. Lastly, participants 
evaluated their current mood state (measured with four Likert-scaled items: “I am in a cheerful 
mood right now;” “I am in a good mood right now;” “I am unhappy right now; and “I am bored 
right now,” α = .80), and indicated their gender and age. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation Check. An ANOVA revealed that the temperature simulation did indeed 
lead to differences in perceived temperature in the desired direction (Mcold = 3.67, Mwarm = 5.15, 
F(1, 96) = 42.24, p < .01). 
 Covariates and Control Measures. An ANOVA revealed that temperature did not lead to 
any differences in mood across the conditions. Neither gender nor age significantly interacted 
with the independent variable (simulated temperature) nor covaried significantly with the 
dependent measure in the study (donation likelihood), and were thus excluded from the 
remaining analysis. However, general concern for endangered species did covary with the 
dependent variable, and was thus included as a covariate in the remaining analysis (greater 
general concern for endangered species led to greater donation likelihood; F(1, 97) = 64.76, p 
<.001). 
 Donation Likelihood. As predicted, an ANOVA revealed a significant simulated 
temperature by scope interaction (F(1, 93) = 5.08, p < .05). Specifically, in the warm temperature 
simulation condition, I predicted that respondents would be using a cognitive process and thus be 
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sensitive to scale. Results confirm that participants were more likely to donate more when there 
were four pandas (MFour Pandas = 4.30) than when there was only one panda in the scenario (MOne 
Panda = 3.44; F(1, 93) = 4.76, p < .05). In the cold temperature condition however, where I 
predicted respondents would rely on emotion and thus be insensitive to scale, the difference 
between the one-panda and four-pandas conditions was, as expected, not significant (MOne Panda = 
4.33, MFour Pandas = 3.96; F (1, 93) < 1). Thus, individuals were scale insensitive only in the cold 
temperature condition. Further, the contrast between the cold and warm conditions was, as 
expected, significant in the one panda condition (MCold = 4.33, MWarm = 3.44; F(1, 93) = 5.20, p < 
.05), but was not significant in the four pandas condition (MCold = 3.96, MWarm = 4.30; F(1, 93) < 
1). See figure 6 for a visual representation of the interaction and planned contrasts.  
 
Figure 6 
Mean Donation Likelihood to Pay by Condition- Study 4 
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 Decision Basis. Again, the 4-item decision basis scale measured whether decisions across 
different conditions were based on respondents' affective reactions or cognitions. To determine 
the extent to which reliance on affect mediated the effect of temperature on willingness to pay, I 
applied a mediated moderation bootstrap procedure (Model 8 in the macro suggested by Hayes, 
2012). Upon specifying a confidence interval of 95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the analysis 
confirmed an indirect effect: the indirect effect of temperature x scope on donation likelihood 
through decision basis was significant, with a confidence interval excluding zero (0.0848 to 
0.8407). These results suggest that reliance on affect mediates the effect of temperature by scope 
on donation likelihood. 
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Study 5: Cake  
 The purpose of study 5 was to provide more robust evidence for my theorizing in a 
different decision making context (i.e. one related to indulgence) and different dependent 
variables (choice and product evaluation). Thus, this study once again investigated the role of 
physical temperature on reliance on emotions in decision-making. The study examined the 
degree to which individuals were relying on affect in two temperature conditions by subjecting 
participants to a binary choice task, in which one alternative, chocolate cake, was superior on the 
affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the other alternative: 
fruit salad (procedure borrowed from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). According to the literature, if 
people are relying on affect, they will be more likely to choose the chocolate cake, but if they are 
relying on their cognitions, they will be more likely to choose the fruit salad (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 1999).  
 
Pretest 
  
 A pretest was conducted to ensure that there were no differences in the perceived 
physical temperature of the two snack options. Fifty-nine undergraduate students from the same 
population as the main study were administered the pretest. Participants were shown a picture of 
either the chocolate cake or the fruit salad, and were asked, “How cold/warm would you expect 
the cake (fruit salad) pictured above to be?” and were provided with a seven point scale anchored 
by “extremely cold” (1) and “extremely warm” (7). An ANOVA did not detect any significant 
difference in perceived temperature between the two snack options (Mcake = 3.67, Mfruit salad = 
3.55; F(1, 58) < .1). 
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Method 
 One hundred and eighteen undergraduate students from an undergraduate subject pool 
were assigned to one of two temperature conditions: cold or warm. Temperature was 
manipulated using the same cup-holding procedure as in Study 3. 
 After being assigned to a manipulation, all participants were presented with a 
hypothetical binary choice task (see Appendix C for experimental stimuli), in which they had to 
choose an afternoon snack to purchase. Between the two options, one alternative, chocolate cake, 
was superior on the affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the 
other alternative, fruit salad (procedure borrowed from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). The main 
dependent variable of interest in this study was the participant’s choice in the binary choice task 
(either chocolate cake or fruit salad). As an additional dependent measure, participants were 
asked to assess their likelihood of purchasing the chocolate cake if not forced to choose (“If you 
were not forced to choose any one option, how likely would you be to purchase the chocolate 
cake?”). To ascertain whether decisions were based on respondents' affective reactions or 
cognitions, participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their choice on the same scale 
used in Study 1a. In addition, participants completed 3 Likert-scaled items to be used as potential 
covariates: health consciousness (“I consider myself a health conscious individual”), general 
preference for chocolate cake (“I am a chocolate cake fanatic”) and general preference for fruit 
salad (“I am a fruit salad fanatic”). Lastly, participants indicated their gender and ethnicity. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Covariates and Control Measures. Checks were also made to ensure that none of the 
covariates significantly interacted with the independent variable (temperature). Of the potential 
covariates, only two (general preference for chocolate cake and general preference for fruit 
salad) covaried significantly with both dependent measures in the study and were thus included 
in the remaining analyses (greater general preference for cake led to increased purchase 
likelihood of cake (F(1, 117) = 10.32, p <.001), and greater general preference for fruit salad led 
to reduced purchase likelihood of cake (F(1, 117) = 2.00, p < .08). 
 Choice and Purchase Likelihood. As predicted, a binary logistic regression analysis 
confirmed a significant main effect of temperature on choice (Χ2 = 8.46 p < .01). In the cold 
temperature condition, 57% of participants chose the chocolate cake, while in the warm 
temperature condition, only 30% of respondents made that choice. Thus, choice probabilities 
differed in the hypothesized direction, suggesting that the affectively superior option dominated 
in the cold condition, but the cognitively superior option dominated in the warm condition. In 
addition, an ANOVA revealed significant main effect of temperature on purchase likelihood of 
cake (“If you were not forced to choose any one option, how likely would you be to purchase the 
chocolate cake”) (F(1, 117) = 4.62, p <.05). Again, results were in the hypothesized direction 
(Mcold = 4.60, Mwarm = 3.75). 
 Decision Basis. As previously mentioned, the four-item decision basis scale (α = .84) 
measured whether decisions across different conditions were based on respondents' affective 
reactions or cognitions (higher values indicated more reliance on affect). An ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of temperature on reliance on affect in the hypothesized direction (Mcold = 4.02, 
Mwarm = 3.27; F(1, 117) = 5.98, p < .05). To determine the extent to which reliance on affect 
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mediated the effect of temperature on choice and purchase likelihood, I applied the bootstrap 
procedure (Model 4 in the macro suggested by Hayes, 2012). Specifying a confidence interval of 
95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the indirect effect of temperature on choice through 
decision basis was significant, with a confidence interval excluding zero (-0.9781 to -0.0323). In 
addition, the indirect effect of temperature on purchase likelihood through decision basis was 
also significant, again with a confidence interval excluding zero (-0.5761 to -0.0483). Thus, these 
results suggest that reliance on affect does indeed mediate the relationship of temperature on 
choice and purchase likelihood of cake. 
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General Discussion 
 Using a thermoregulatory framework in which organisms use various bodily organs to 
adjust their temperature (Kirkes 1899; Romanovsky 2007), I explored whether a mere mental 
process relying on emotions (cognitions) can function as a warming (cooling) mechanism, and 
whether individuals might be induced to alter their decision-making style to fulfill 
thermoregulatory objectives in response to experienced physical temperatures.  I document the 
ability of affective and cognitive pathways to function as warming and cooling mechanisms, 
leading to both self-reported and objective increases and decreases in recorded temperature. 
Further, I demonstrate that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing 
temperature-related comfort. Lastly, but crucially, I document the effect of physical temperature 
on choice, willingness to pay, and donation likelihood, and support the role of reliance on 
emotions, a mental but ultimately brain-based pathway, as a mediator. Thus, taken as a set, these 
five studies provide converging support for my proposed mental thermoregulation framework 
(Appendix A). 
 This research makes several meaningful theoretical contributions. As previously 
mentioned, the current research supports the proposition that reliance on emotions (cognitions) 
can function as a warming (cooling) process, and individuals may accordingly (and perhaps 
nonconsciously) alter their decision-making style to fulfill thermoregulatory objectives in 
response to experienced physical temperatures. Specifically, I suggest that an individual may 
choose to adopt a decision-making process that is semantically consistent with his or her 
thermoregulatory objective (and thus inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory state). As far 
as the author is aware, no research has examined whether an individual’s decision-making 
process can function to change perceived or actual temperature, nor whether an attempt to do so 
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may be part of an individual’s regulatory strategy. Further, I additionally contribute by 
documenting the ability of affective and cognitive pathways to function as warming and cooling 
mechanisms, suggesting that autonomic physiological responses (ex. sweating, shivering) are not 
the only way in which we programmatically regulate our temperature. 
 Hence, unlike most previous and emerging literature on embodiment (Williams and 
Bargh 2008), this research provides an example and explanation of why individuals may respond 
to physical sensations in a compensatory fashion. Instead of merely assimilating to the physical 
temperature in a semantically consistent manner (i.e. relying on emotions more when warm), 
physical sensations might instead activate a thermoregulatory goal, thus motivating individuals 
to embody a process with a semantically-opposite thermoregulatory tone. Hence, this manuscript 
paves the way for research to explore other instances in which physical sensations may lead to 
goal-driven behavior in a pattern that is metaphorically inconsistent with an experienced physical 
state. Such new research streams might explore how other atmospheric dimensions aside from 
temperature can lead to changes in mental processes. Lighting, for example, is one such 
dimension. Retailers such as Abercrombie and Fitch use dim illumination in their stores with the 
objective of projecting a particular brand image. However, emerging research suggests the use of 
dim illumination may have unintended consequences, creating a goal of increasing cognitive 
illumination, operationalized as feelings of decision certainty (King 2013). Illumination and 
temperature, then, appear to be two perceptual dimensions of atmospherics that may influence 
higher order, executive processes that influence the relative use of mental processes. Beyond 
illumination and temperature, it would be important to identify additional perceptual dimensions 
that can have an influence on cognitive and affective processing.   
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 There has been a recent call for research that explores antecedents to affective processing, 
or “affective engineering” (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade 2008; Pham 2012). This research 
represents a step in this direction by proposing a precursor to increased use of affective 
information in consumer decisions, and contributes to the literature on atmospherics by assessing 
the role of temperature on consumer judgment. Further, by exploring the impact of physical 
temperature via a thermoregulatory framework, I address the call to more critically examine 
processes by which sensory cues exert their effects (Krishna 2012). 
 Finally, from a broader, more structural perspective, the results of the experiments are 
also consistent with Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio’s (1991) Somatic Marker Hypothesis, which 
posits that the organism’s brain and body generates some aspects of the anticipated stimulus to 
help guide decision making, with temperature being one aspect that carries information for the 
organism. The nature of information carried by temperature for the organism is a promising 
avenue for further research. 
 Several practical implications stem from these research findings as well. Physical 
temperature can be manipulated in retail environments via thermostat control, or providing 
patrons with a warm or cool drink. A retailer selling hedonic goods would likely benefit a 
consumer’s reliance on affect, and thus may profit by lowering the environmental temperature in 
the retail space. Interestingly, a New York Times article titled, “Shivering of Luxury,” suggests 
external validity to this finding by reporting a strong negative correlation between a retailer’s 
prices and store temperature- the ritzier the establishment, the lower the thermostat setting 
(Salkin 2005). The current research suggests that this may be an effective strategy for luxury 
retailers, since low temperatures may induce patrons to adopt a more affective mind-set, in which 
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they are more likely to legitimize hedonic and indulgent purchases. A restaurant hoping to entice 
patrons with its indulgent dessert selections might similarly benefit from lowered temperatures.  
 This research also provides marketing applications for advertising and promotions. Aside 
from temperature manipulation via store-based thermostat control, companies can impact 
individuals’ experienced temperature via non-traditional promotional campaigns. For example, 
Columbia Sportswear recently set up a mobile walk-in freezer in Manhattan’s Bryant Park, 
where consumers were encouraged sing karaoke while testing the brand’s new heated apparel. 
Kraft Foods, on the other hand, built and maintained heated bus shelters in an attempt to convey 
the warmth consumers would feel from eating stuffing (Elliott 2008). While these promotional 
campaigns are meant to highlight product benefits, companies should be cognizant of the 
unintentional consequences on a consumer’s decision-making style. Further, because this 
research also showed that such processing differences can stem from simulated temperature, 
advertisers should also consider the impact of inducing temperature sensations via ad copy, 
images, and color usage. 
 Future research in this area might test a few potential moderators of the thermoregulation 
process. These might include a measure of self-monitoring and/or temperature tolerance, for 
example. A less intuitive, conceptually interesting moderator could be individual propensities to 
gain weight or become obese, if temperature regulation is ultimately underpinned by energy 
regulation. If warm temperatures induce relatively more cognitive processing, exposure to 
warmth may be an important intervention for people with obesity. Indeed, there is some 
correlational evidence that lower temperatures lead to lower rates of obesity (Bo 2011). If such 
measures do indeed moderate the process, they might help establish boundary conditions for the 
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psychologically mediated thermoregulation process, and build a functional account for when and 
why temperatures influence mental processes in organisms. 
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Appendix A: Illustration of Proposed Model 
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Appendix B: Instructions for Studies 1 and 2 
 
Participants in the Affective Instructions condition read the following:  
“For each of the following scenarios, please describe in detail the emotional experience 
that comes to mind. In other words, we are interested in your feelings towards each 
scenario. Would the scenario make you feel pleasant or “positive” (e.g., happy, joyful, 
pleased, proud) or would it make you feel unpleasant or “negative” (e.g., sad, angry, 
disgusted, scared)? Please focus on your emotions when responding.” 
 
Participants in the Cognitive Instructions condition read the following: 
“For each of the following scenarios, please describe in detail the advantages and 
disadvantages of each experience. In other words are interested in your objective 
evaluation of each scenario. By evaluation, we mean a judgment of the pros and cons of 
scenario. Please focus on your objective judgments when responding.” 
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Appendix C: Stimuli used in Study 3 
 
All participants read the following: 
“Suppose that you are about to move to a new city. Your company will pay for all the 
moving expenses. Among the things you ask the moving company to ship is an antique 
clock. There is some chance that the clock may get lost in shipment. The moving 
company does not provide insurance, but you can purchase insurance from an 
independent company yourself. Buying insurance will not affect the chance of loss, but if 
you buy insurance and the clock is lost, you will receive $100 in compensation.” 
  
In addition, those in the “low sentiment” condition read the following: 
“The clock no longer works and cannot be repaired. It has literally no market value. It 
does not have much sentimental value to you. It was a gift from a remote relative on your 
5th birthday. You didn't like it very much then, and you still don't have any special 
feeling for it now.” 
 
Those in the “high sentiment” condition read the following: 
“The clock no longer works and cannot be repaired. It has literally no market value. 
However, it has a lot of sentimental value to you. It was a gift from your grandparents on 
your 5th birthday. You grew up with it. You learned how to read time from it. You have 
always loved it very much.” 
 
46 
Appendix D: Stimuli Used in Study 4 
Participants in the One-Panda condition read the following: 
 
Participants in the Four-Pandas condition read the following: 
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Appendix E: Stimuli Used in Study 5 
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